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In this paper we examine the holistic processing of faces from an evolutionary perspective,
clarifying what such an approach entails, and evaluating the extent to which the evidence
currently available permits any strong conclusions. While it seems clear that the holistic
processing of faces depends on mechanisms evolved to perform that task, our review of
the comparative literature reveals that there is currently insufficient evidence (or some-
times insufficiently compelling evidence) to decide when in our evolutionary past such
processing may have arisen. It is also difficult to assess what kinds of selection pressures
may have led to evolution of such a mechanism, or even what kinds of information holistic
processing may have originally evolved to extract, given that many sources of socially rel-
evant face-based information other than identity depend on integrating information across
different regions of the face – judgments of expression, behavioral intent, attractiveness,
sex, age, etc. We suggest some directions for future research that would help to answer
these important questions.
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Holistic and/or configural processing is frequently identified as a
uniquely defining characteristic of facial identity recognition, and
for many proponents of this view there is a (sometimes implicit)
assumption that this is the consequence of using a specialized
brain region adapted, via evolution, to perform this task. Our
intention in this paper is to make explicit the implications (and
non-implications) of such an assumption, to review some of the
extant relevant evidence, to propose some theories of how such an
arrangement could have come about,and to suggest possible future
research projects that might help us to address some of the many
unanswered questions. Because the clearest test of evolutionary
theories involve cross-species comparisons, a large part of our aim
is to re-review some of the comparative literature, with emphasis
on a critical analysis of the methodology used. We believe that
this is important because although face processing in general has
recently been reviewed across widespread species (Leopold and
Rhodes, 2010), and holistic processing has been examined across
the primates (Parr, 2011), these reviews were broad in scope, and
so did not focus much on the quality of the evidence collected,
which is critical when conclusions need to be drawn from very
few studies with any given species, as is typical in the comparative
literature.
AN EVOLVED MODULE?
There is considerable, and occasionally vigorous, debate focused
on whether face-based identity recognition is achieved via a spe-
cialized face-processing module, or whether instead the appar-
ently “special” aspects of face processing are a consequence of
the fact that ontogenetically faces are a category of object that
we routinely recognize at the exemplar/subordinate level, and
with which we have enormous expertise (e.g., Gauthier and Tarr,
1997; Gauthier and Bukach, 2007; McKone and Robbins, 2007;
McKone et al., 2007). Although it is theoretically important to
determine the role played by particular kinds of experience in
shaping the mechanisms underlying facial identity processing, it
is not widely appreciated that the answer to this empirical ques-
tion actually holds no implications for the evolutionary origin
of our ability to recognize individuals based on their face, and
whether that ability depends on a specially evolved neural mod-
ule. An evolved face-processing module, that processes faces in a
holistic/configural way, is actually just as likely to be influenced
by input as it is to develop independently of specific experi-
ences. This is particularly so, given that the mechanism must alter
on the basis of input in order to function effectively, and that
it can be virtually guaranteed appropriate input during normal
development.
Since individual faces must be learned, any identity sensitive
mechanism will necessarily be affected by input, and since all nor-
mally developing individuals will be exposed to a large number
of faces throughout their development, an evolved mechanism
that generated holistic/configural processing only after lengthy
exposure to objects that had to be discriminated at a subor-
dinate level (if such evidence were found) would still likely
be an evolved face-processing mechanism, since this would be
its usual phenotypic effect, and almost certainly the effect for
which it was selected, evolutionarily. And so from an evolution-
ary perspective, the claim that the “face-sensitive” mechanism
is really just a “subordinate-level expertise” mechanism is not
a counter-claim at all in the absence of some putative alterna-
tive function (or side-effect of some other function) for such
a mechanism. It would be like proposing that an evolved “lan-
guage” mechanism is not really a language mechanism, per se, but
an “auditory syntactic/semantic” mechanism, or perhaps more
obviously, that the heart is not really evolved to pump blood
since it is as capable of pumping any other fluid of similar
viscosity.
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While the importance of learning to the development and
functioning of the mechanism is not a reliable way of identifying
evolved adaptations (a point recently very well made by Barrett,
2012) – many evolved mechanisms are learning mechanism, after
all – there are established ways of identifying adaptations and these
can be applied to the neural mechanism that processes faces holis-
tically/configurally. The two common methods used by behavioral
scientists to test whether a mechanism has been adapted by evolu-
tion to perform a particular function,and to attempt to understand
how that evolution may have occurred, are to examine the phy-
logenetic and/or ecological distribution of the mechanism across
species, or by generating specific, unique predictions about the
mechanism that reflect its function and that would be unlikely to
be true of a general process mechanism.
Ultimately, a mechanism needs to be shown to have fitness con-
sequences (to aid survival and/or reproduction) and to be affected
by particular genes to be unequivocally identified as an adaptation,
but for many mechanisms these criteria are difficult to meet. For
example, the effect of genes on the expression of a trait is often
identified using heritability estimates (the proportion of popula-
tion variance in the trait attributable to genetic variation), but if
a trait has reached fixation in a population then it will show no
heritability because there will be no variance to attribute to genetic
influences. Fixation happens when possessing a trait is universally
useful, and particularly when individuals who lack the trait are
at a distinct disadvantage compared to those who have it, and so
selection eventually results in the whole population expressing the
trait (the trait reaches fixation). Obviously, even in the absence of
identifying the particular genes responsible for a trait, and in the
absence of heritability estimates, universally present, clearly func-
tional traits, like smiling or the eyebrow raise greeting, are rightly
regarded as likely evolved adaptations.
Interestingly, face-recognition ability does show substantial
heritability (evidence summarized by McKone and Palermo,
2010), raising a range of questions about why it should vary
across the population. As McKone and Palermo point out, the
fact that face-recognition ability varies independently of IQ, and
shows IQ-independent heritability, is evidence that it depends on
an independently evolved neural module, but the fact that it shows
much heritability at all is somewhat surprising if that module
evolved to aid survival, since such traits tend to reach fixation.
An interesting possibility is that the residual variation might be
because face-recognition ability (or at least some of it) is sexually,
rather than naturally, selected (serving mate attraction/selection
functions). While natural selection tends to lead to trait fixation
(since variation from the “ideal” is selected against), sexual selec-
tion tends to preserve variation in traits (Arnold, 1983), since the
kinds of traits that become the subject of sexual selection (those
upon which mate-choice decisions or intra-sexual competition
depend) are those that accurately reveal variation in underlying
quality in an informative/conditional way.
In addition to the challenges presented by trait fixation in mea-
suring the survival and/or reproductive benefits of possessing a
particular mechanism (compared with not possessing it), there are
also problems associated with the fact that some adaptations are
vestigial (goose-bumps or the grasp reflex in humans, for exam-
ple), and so will no longer have measurable fitness consequences.
Given these difficulties, mechanisms are usually identified as likely
adaptations if they show signs of being designed to perform a par-
ticular function and/or vary across species in a way that maps on to
known phylogenies and/or ecological demands. We will examine
the evidence that holistic processing of faces meets these criteria.
PHYLOGENETIC DISTRIBUTION
While individual recognition appears to be phylogenetically wide-
spread, at least among social species (Tibbetts and Dale, 2007),
and plays an important role in a range of social interactions,
like maintaining dominance hierarchies and reuniting mates and
parent-offspring pairs, most of this recognition utilizes auditory
or olfactory information. Few species have actually been tested for
genuinely individual visual recognition abilities, perhaps because
for many it is simply assumed based on differential treatment of
group members (mates or offspring vs. rivals, or higher- vs. lower-
ranking individuals, for example). Unfortunately, such behavior
need not depend on actual recognition of any particular individual
(Tibbetts and Dale, 2007), since there may be other visual mark-
ers of social status or relatedness that can be used to reliably guide
social behavior (size or color, for example). There is evidence,using
discrimination learning, match-to-sample, or dishabituation tech-
niques, that cattle (Coulon et al., 2011), horses (Proops et al., 2009),
jacky lizards (Van Dyk and Evans, 2007), and chickens (Ryan and
Lea, 1994) can recognize individual conspecifics based only on
visual information. There is also evidence for specifically facial
recognition of dogs and humans by dogs (Racca et al., 2010), of
sheep and humans by sheep (Kendrick et al., 1995, 1996), of paper
wasps by paper wasps (Tibbetts, 2002), of humans by honeybees
(Dyer et al., 2005), of pigeons by pigeons (Watanabe and Ito, 1991),
of a range of primates by pigeons (Phelps and Roberts, 1994), and
of course of both monkey and human recognition in a range of
primates (reviewed by Parr, 2011), especially old-world monkeys
(typically Maccaca species) who form the bulk of the subjects
for single cell recording studies. While such findings suggest that
face-based individuation might be phylogenetically widespread
(Leopold and Rhodes, 2010), it is important to examine both the
training and testing methodologies employed in these studies to
assess the extent to which the reported ability maps on to human
facial recognition. This is especially true when evaluating not just
whether other species can discriminate between individuals based
on their face (although this is important to know), but whether
the way in which they do this is in some way like the way humans
do it – whether it depends on holistic/configural processing.
PHYLOGENETIC DISTRIBUTION – BASIC RECOGNITION
To our knowledge, the only species that have only been tested
for the basic ability to use the face (or at least the head) to rec-
ognize other individuals of their own species are cattle (Coulon
et al., 2011), pigeons (Watanabe and Ito, 1991), horses (Proops
et al., 2009), and paper wasps (Tibbetts, 2002). Widely different
techniques and stimuli are used in these studies – from reinforc-
ing pecking at slides of unknown individuals to counting directed
aggressive acts after modifying the head color pattern with paint –
but each provides convincing support for the claim that these
species can individuate conspecifics using visual information from
their heads, the first step in face recognition as it occurs in humans.
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That they are species with such a wide phylogenetic spread is a
reflection of testing species-particular hypotheses about individ-
ual recognition rather than a systematic attempt to examine how
widespread such recognition is. In each case, the social ecology of
the species and the existence of distinctive head markings (espe-
cially color patterns) was used to predict the successful use of the
head as a recognition cue, but this may be a reflection of selection
for the evolution of individuating cues (Tibbetts and Dale, 2007)
rather than for face-processing mechanisms per se. It is perfectly
possible that in each case the face markings have evolved to cap-
italize on visual discrimination mechanisms that were already in
place (to serve other functions), without any extra evolutionary
modification of these perceptual mechanisms being necessary.
PHYLOGENETIC DISTRIBUTION – INVERSION EFFECTS
The most common test of the use of configural processing to recog-
nize faces is to measure the effect of inverting the stimuli (rotating
them 180˚ in the picture plane). In humans, there is a dispropor-
tionate inversion effect for human faces (Yin, 1969) – many stimuli
are less accurately and more slowly matched or recognized when
inverted, but this is especially so for faces. The most surprising
report of an inversion effect on face-recognition performance is
that of Dyer et al. (2005) for honeybees discriminating human
faces, and an analysis of the methods used is instructive for inter-
preting other reports of inversion effects (or their absence) in other
species. Obviously, honeybees do not have an evolved mechanism
for recognizing human faces (or even other honeybees, since this
is accomplished at a colony-level of categorization, chemosenso-
rily – Breed, 1998), and Dyer et al. were explicit about the fact
that if they could nevertheless recognize individuals and show an
inversion effect, then that would cast doubt on claims that humans
recognize each other using a specially evolved mechanism. There
is room to question the logic of this claim, since the bees could
do the job in a very different way (and the inversion effect is only
one marker of holistic/configural processing), but there is no real
need to do so because Dyer et al. did not, in fact, demonstrate
even individual recognition, let alone a disproportionate inversion
effect.
Bees were rewarded (with sucrose) for approaching a single
exemplar of the face of one individual (CS+) and punished (with
quinine) for approaching first a schematic face (CS−) and then
a single exemplar of a different individual (there were actually
two CS+ and two CS− faces displayed on each trial). In unre-
warded “transfer” tests bees approached the previously rewarded
face significantly more often (in the 80% range) than either of
two previously unseen faces. This is not really a transfer test in
the traditional sense (cf. Burke et al., 2001, as an example, who
tested transfer to novel examples of vertical and horizontal), in
that only novel CS− stimuli were included, not novel CS+ stim-
uli. In fact, it seems likely that the bees may well have failed even a
transfer test to different exemplars of the previously rewarded and
previously punished individuals’ faces, since they had only been
trained with a single exemplar of each and so were free (and in a
sense encouraged) to base the discrimination on any feature (like
brightness, contrast, width, presence of a blemish or shadow in a
particular place, pattern of contrast or brightness change over time
as the bees moved in front of the faces, etc.) that differentiated the
stimuli (a tactic that we know pigeons use whenever possible –
Watanabe, 1993). Provided the novel CS− stimuli also lacked the
feature (or features) each bee relied on to select the CS+, they
would also be rejected without the bees being able to genuinely
recognize individuals based on their face. Similarly, inverting the
faces is very likely to alter the location or patterning of the feature,
or features, used to perform the discrimination, and so disrupt
performance – again, without the bees recognizing individuals, let
alone doing so using configural information (as Dyer et al. sug-
gest they might). The experiment as reported seems as likely to
work starting with inverted faces (or indeed any other category of
object) as training stimuli, and then transferring to upright faces,
and we know that humans do not learn to processes inverted faces
holistically/configurally (Robbins and McKone, 2003) even after
considerably more trials than the bees were trained with. Without
any evidence that the bees were performing the discrimination
based on facial identity, and without an examination of the extent
to which they showed an inversion effect for discriminations with
other categories of objects (to test whether the face inversion effect
is disproportionately large), there is no reason to suppose that bees
process human faces configurally/holistically.
The other non-primates that have been tested for the inversion
effect are sheep (Kendrick et al., 1995, 1996), dogs (Racca et al.,
2010), and pigeons (Phelps and Roberts, 1994 – although they were
tested with primate, not pigeon, faces). Phelps and Roberts trained
pigeons to discriminate between pairs of faces (one of which was
arbitrarily designated correct) that were either both upright or
both inverted, and found that the pigeons discriminated upright
and inverted human,“monkey” and “great ape” faces equally well –
they showed no evidence at all of an inversion effect for these faces.
A spider monkey and human participants, tested in an essentially
identical fashion, showed inversion effects for all categories of pri-
mate faces, although larger effects for human faces, but this was the
only category that only contained one species, so this is unsurpris-
ing (as explained later). This shows both that pigeons do not have a
mechanism that responds to upright primate faces like humans do
(perhaps unsurprisingly, although the authors also briefly reported
a pilot failure to find an inversion effect for “bird” faces), and that
upright primate faces are not intrinsically easier to discriminate
than inverted primate faces (in the absence of such a mechanism).
Racca et al. studied face processing in dogs using a visual paired
comparison method – a match-to-sample habituation paradigm,
in which a sample stimulus is replaced by two spatially separated
images, one of which matches the sample. Typically, subjects spend
more time looking at the new stimulus, although in this study dogs
did this for common objects and human faces, but for dog faces
they actually looked more at image of the previously presented
individual. Differential looking (albeit in different directions for
human and dog faces) was taken as evidence of individuation.
Although the matching faces are reported to be different photos of
a particular individual (from slightly different perspectives), and
they were manipulated to prevent matching based on brightness
or contrast, from the example figures they look remarkably similar,
so it is not completely convincing that the dogs were recognizing
individuals. When the sample stimulus was upright but the test
images were inverted (it is usual in human studies to have both
sample and test stimuli upright or inverted, since then neither task
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requires an image transformation) then no significant differences
in looking time for any of the stimuli was found, and so while there
is evidence of a version of the inversion effect there is no evidence
of a disproportionate inversion effect for faces (of either dogs or
humans), and so no evidence of configural/holistic processing of
faces by dogs.
Perhaps the best-known non-primate face research is that of
Kendrick and colleagues (Kendrick et al., 1995, 1996; Peirce et al.,
2000, 2001). In the original study (Kendrick et al., 1995) sheep
were trained in a Y maze to choose between the face a of sheep and
that of a human, or a sheep and a dog, etc. (with sheep choices
reinforced), and so it is actually surprising that the reported inver-
sion effect occurred at all, given that there is no need to base this
discrimination on facial identity or even a configuration of fea-
tures – a wide range of individual features would serve to reliably
pick the sheep “face.” There is some evidence of a speed-accuracy
tradeoff when the faces are inverted, and so perhaps the greater
speed with which responses to inverted stimuli were made affected
accuracy. Kendrick et al. (1996) improved on this methodology by
training sheep to discriminate between the photos of different
individual sheep (but still only single exemplars of a particular
individual) with both faces upright or both faces inverted. There
were no transfer tests – all pairs of stimuli were differentially rein-
forced on every trial, and trained in (two) different orders – and so
the inversion effect reported is a consequence of being better able
to learn to respond differentially to upright or inverted faces (the
same faces were used in the upright and inverted conditions). For
own-breed (but unfamiliar) sheep faces (Clun Forest), the sheep
performed better when the faces were upright (approximately 85%
compared to 75% performance), but with other (and unfamiliar)
breed faces (Dalesbred) there was no effect of inversion (if any-
thing it is in the wrong direction). With upright faces the sheep also
found it much easier to associate rewards with particular familiar
sheep than with particular unfamiliar sheep of their own-breed.
This difference was not tested with inverted faces, and so, unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to tell whether the lack of inversion effect for
other breed faces is due to them being less like the faces with which
they are familiar, or to the fact that Dalesbred sheep have many
more non-configural features to distinguish individuals – includ-
ing distinctive white spots on their faces and long, differentially
curling horns (Clun Forest sheep have uniformly black faces and
no horns). There was also no effect of inversion for a picture of
an empty vs. a full food bucket, but since the presence or absence
of food is signaled by a very obvious featural cue (the food), this
does not really provide convincing evidence for a disproportionate
inversion effect for sheep faces.
Parr (2011) reviews evidence for inversion effects in non-
human primates (among other markers of holistic processing
discussed later), and concludes that the evidence is good for com-
mon Chimpanzees, but mixed for monkeys – the other apes and
prosimians have never been tested. While it is true that evidence
from monkeys is mixed, failure to find evidence for an inversion
effect can occur for many reasons other than the species in ques-
tion failing to process faces holistically/configurally, and so a brief
examination of the strength of the evidence is warranted.
Two of the earliest studies to attempt to reconcile previously
contradictory reports of inversion effects in monkeys are those of
Phelps and Roberts (1994) and Wright and Roberts (1996). Using
match-to-sample and discrimination learning procedures, both
studies reported inversion effects for human, ape, and monkey
faces, but not with outdoor scenes, and bigger inversion effects for
human faces. Phelps and Roberts used squirrel monkeys, a new
world species, and Wright and Roberts used Rhesus macaques,
an old-world species, suggesting a phylogenetically widespread
disproportionate inversion effect for faces in monkeys, and so pos-
sibly a relatively early evolutionary origin of configural processing
of faces in the primates. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions
about the relative size of the inversion effect for monkey, ape, and
humans faces since, as described earlier when pigeons were the
participants, the human face discriminations involved pictures of
different human faces, but the “ape” and “monkey” tasks involved
discriminations between different species that happened to be apes
or monkeys. Given this, the surprising aspect of these results is
that there was an inversion effect at all for ape and monkey faces
(indeed there only just was in Wright and Roberts), not that it was
bigger for human faces. For this reason it is perhaps premature
to speculate on whether some kinds of primate faces might bet-
ter support configural/holistic processing, as do these authors and
Parr (2011).
Subsequent studies have avoided the stimulus problems of these
studies, but have not yet managed to produce a clear picture of the
distribution of inversion effects in primates, largely because of
methodological concerns. In studies run by Parr and colleagues,
for example, it seems to be true that rhesus macaques require many
more training trials to acquire the match-to-sample task than do
chimpanzees, which raises questions about whether they are pro-
cessing the stimuli in the same way. To take an example, Parr et al.
(1998) found that Chimpanzees showed an inversion effect for
human and chimpanzee faces (those with which they had expe-
rience), but not for the faces of capuchin monkeys (a new world
species) or cars, but that Rhesus macaques (Parr et al., 1999) tested
in much the same way (but requiring many more trials – about
2000 per category) showed inversion effects for the rhesus faces,
capuchin faces, cars, and human faces (not significant, but as large
as the other primate inversion effects), but not for abstract sym-
bols. The monkeys had had prior training on similar tasks but
not with socially relevant stimuli, in which they may have learned
to process visually presented stimuli in such tasks in a way that
interfered with subsequent face discriminations. In any case, so
many training trials suggests an unusual method of learning the
match-to-sample procedure. All monkeys were unfortunately also
tested with the same order of stimulus conditions (rhesus, shapes,
capuchin, then human), and were not tested with novel exemplars,
and so it is impossible to tell what role was played by particular
exemplars and/or the order of testing.
Further muddying the picture of inversion effects in non-
human primates is the fact that Parr et al. (2008) did find evidence
of a disproportionate inversion effect for faces with rhesus mon-
keys (for human, chimp, and rhesus faces, but not for houses or
clip art objects) and that when examined in detail, the chimpanzee
inversion effect is somewhat odd. Parr and Heintz (2006) tested
match-to-sample performance for chimpanzee faces and houses
(with what appears, from the example figures, to be an unfortu-
nately heterogeneous set of houses) with stimuli rotated in the
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picture plane 0, 45, 90, 135, and 180˚. Although there is evidence
of a substantial inversion effect for the chimp faces but not the
houses at 180˚, this is tempered by the fact that performance with
houses was as bad as it was for inverted chimp faces at 45 and
135˚ – whenever the houses were at oblique angles – suggesting an
unusual method of matching these stimuli. Chimp face matching
was also very poor at 90˚ – worse than at 135˚ – which is not the pat-
tern found when humans are tested with such rotations, in which
there is a linear falloff in performance as orientation deviates from
upright (Collishaw and Hole, 2002).
That methodological rather than species differences underlie
the inconsistent results reported previously is supported by three
relatively recent clear demonstrations of disproportionate inver-
sion effects for faces in monkeys, each of which also shows evidence
of holistic/configural processing being tuned to faces with which
the monkeys have experience. Using a visual paired comparisons
methodology (the habituation equivalent of match-to-sample),
Gothard et al. (2009) using rhesus macaques (old world), and
Neiworth et al. (2007), using cotton-top tamarins (a new world
species), both showed clear evidence of an inversion effect for the
faces of conspecifics (this was also true for human participants in
Neiworth et al.) that was bigger than it was for other categories. In
Gothard et al. the inversion effect for rhesus faces was bigger than
for human faces, with which the monkeys had much less experi-
ence, and in Neiworth et al. the tamarins showed inversions effects
for tamarin and human faces (with which they had experience),
but not chimpanzee faces or objects. Similarly, using a match-to-
sample procedure, but testing with novel exemplars, and so ruling
out face-particular featural matching, Pokorny et al. (2011), using
capuchin monkeys, found an inversion effect for capuchin and
human faces (bigger for capuchins, although overall performance
was also much poorer for human faces, so this could be a floor
effect), but no significant inversion effect for chimpanzee faces or
cars.
In summary, the most convincing evidence for a dispropor-
tionate inversion effect for faces actually comes from studies with
monkeys, and there is some evidence that this effect extends to
other primate faces with which the monkeys have experience.
While the evidence for a disproportionate inversion effect in other
species is not compelling, this may reflect differential research
effort rather than genuine phylogenetic discontinuities.
PHYLOGENETIC DISTRIBUTION – COMPOSITE EFFECT
The other main index of configural/holistic processing that has
been tested in non-humans is the composite effect – better recog-
nition of one half of a face (typically the top) when it is presented
misaligned with the bottom half of a different individual’s face
than when it is presented in alignment with a different bottom
half. When the mismatching halves are presented aligned, the ten-
dency to process them holistically interferes with our ability to
extract the identity of just the top half. To our knowledge only
four studies have looked for the existence of the composite effect
in non-humans, and, despite some conclusions to the contrary, in
only one case is the evidence compelling. The first study to test for
a composite effect was run by Parr et al. (2006), using chimpanzee
subjects, and although the composite stimuli were produced in
the usual way, the test procedure did not actually examine the
chimpanzees’ ability to recognize half-faces aligned vs. misaligned,
and so did not actually test for the composite effect. Instead, in
a match-to-sample procedure, aligned or misaligned chimp and
human half-faces appeared as samples, and then chimps had a
choice between the whole face from which the bottom half had
come and the whole face from which the top half had come. Since
there was no correct answer (they could match based on tops or
bottoms of faces) such trials were non-differentially reinforced, a
procedure that unfortunately provided no means of measuring the
existence or otherwise of the composite effect for chimpanzees.
In two later studies by Taubert and Parr (2009) and Taubert
(2010), Spider monkeys (a new world species) and rhesus
macaques were trained in an improved match-to-sample proce-
dure in which they learned to respond to matches in just the top
half of a face (Taubert and Burke, 2008), and so could be properly
tested for the composite effect – albeit a slightly unusual composite
effect in that whole faces (one of which was the individual from the
top half of the sample) were matched with aligned or misaligned
samples. While these studies utilized an improved training tech-
nique, and incorporated testing with novel exemplars, the nature
of the results renders them inconclusive. Across the two studies,
spider monkeys are reported to show a composite effect for human
and spider monkey faces, but not for chimp, gorilla, or sheep faces
or stick objects, and rhesus macaques to only show a composite
effect for chimpanzee faces (not for human, gorilla, or sheep faces
or stick objects). The rhesus results seem particularly puzzling
(although they were not actually tested with rhesus faces), but in
fact, there is no reason to suppose that any of the results reflect
the standard composite effect, since in each case where a signifi-
cant composite effect is reported it is caused by substantially below
chance performance on aligned trials. For both species of mon-
key judging monkey half-faces, this is as low as 25% – as far from
chance as the best misaligned performance (75%) – a result for
which there is no straightforward explanation. An additional puz-
zle is that without any further training one of the spider monkeys
studied by Taubert managed to perform above chance (with just 24
trials in each category) when the composite stimuli were inverted,
regardless of whether the to-be-matched half was that with the
eyes (as it had been for every training trial, but which were now at
the bottom of the image) or with the chin. Taubert describes this
as “remarkable,” but given the trouble other monkeys have been
reported to have with match-to-sample tasks (Parr, 2011), the
significantly below chance performance reported for these indi-
viduals in the immediately preceding experiment (and with no
further training), and the inevitability of errors whilst acquiring
feedback about the new contingency (with no way for the monkey
to even know whether an inverted stimulus was from a chin-match
or an eye-match trial),“remarkable”is perhaps an understatement.
The result, like the 25% performance on aligned trials in experi-
ment 1, is, if not inexplicable, then at least unexplained. Whatever
accounts for the curious results in these experiments, it is clear that
they do not provide convincing evidence of a composite effect for
the monkeys tested.
Despite attempts to dismiss the finding because the depen-
dent variable used was eye movements (Taubert, 2010; Parr, 2011),
the only good evidence for the composite effect in non-humans
actually comes from a study by Dahl et al. (2007) using Rhesus
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macaques. Using a slightly modified dishabituation or rebound
from adaptation paradigm as an indirect index of recognition (but
with the advantage of requiring no training to recognize individ-
uals or learn a match-to-sample task), monkeys adapted to either
an aligned or misaligned picture of an unknown conspecific, and
were then shown the same top half aligned (if it had been aligned at
adaptation) or misaligned (if it had been misaligned) paired with a
new bottom half. Monkeys showed greater rebound from adapta-
tion (dishabituation) for aligned than for misaligned composites,
suggesting the perception of a new individual in the aligned condi-
tion. Although marmoset faces were used in an earlier experiment
in this study, to test for untrained, entry-level classification of faces,
only rhesus faces were used in the composite task, and so we have
no data on the extent to which this holistic processing extends to
the faces of other species.
HOLISTIC PROCESSING IN NON-HUMANS
Much of this review has focused on the fact that there are frequently
methodological reasons for questioning the conclusiveness of the
failures (or successes) to demonstrate holistic/configural process-
ing of faces in many of the species that have been tested. In addition
to the limitations already discussed, whenever a photograph is
used with non-humans (which is how all such experiments have
been run) we need to wonder about whether the subject actually
sees it as a face, and bases its discrimination performance on this
aspect. Humans have a lifetime of experience with such stimuli,
and so have learned to effortlessly see the image as a depiction of
a real object. In contrast, if the first exposure an animal has to a
photograph is in a discrimination experiment, in the absence an
explicit attempt to teach them that the images depict objects, by
reinforcing selection of the same individual (or object) depicted
in multiple different photographs, for example, we cannot rule out
the possibility that they are just responding to particular features
in the images, and so cannot properly interpret failures to find
inversion effects as an absence of holistic/configural processing of
faces.
Even with these methodological considerations in mind, there
is quite good evidence of a disproportionate inversion effect for
faces in two new world monkey species (cotton-top tamarins and
capuchin monkeys), an old-world monkey (rhesus macaques), and
of course, in humans, but no conclusive evidence yet of such an
effect for a non-primate. Given that the lineages of new world
monkeys and old-world monkeys (and apes, including humans)
diverged about 40 million years ago, this either suggests an old
adaptation for the kind of face processing that underpins the dis-
proportionate inversion effect (which may not even be unique to
primates), or something about the social ecology of humans, rhe-
sus macaques, cotton-top tamarins, and capuchins that selected for
this kind of face processing. It is not immediately obvious what this
social ecological commonality might be (humans and rhesus live
in much bigger groups, for example), and so perhaps the former
alternative is more likely, but without more thorough, method-
ologically sound attempts to test related species we cannot answer
this question definitively. Of the other species tested to date, we
do not have definitive evidence that they do not show a dispro-
portionate inversion effect, only that there is insufficient evidence
to conclude that they do. The most straightforward way to test
between a more modest version of the idea that such processing is
phylogenetically old or is due to different social ecologies would
be to compare the disproportionate inversion effect in the extant
apes, which have dramatically different social structures, ranging
from essentially solitary orang-utans, to small familial bands in
gorillas and gibbons, and gregarious, fission-fusion groupings in
common chimpanzees and bonobos.
The only two species for which we have strong evidence of a
composite effect are rhesus macaques and humans, each for the
faces of their own species. This is an obvious area where again, it
would be useful to measure the composite effect (ideally for the
faces of a range of species) in at least the extant apes, and possibly
some new world monkeys to examine the phylogenetic extent of
the effect. It would also be worthwhile looking for evidence of this
effect in the face processing of other social species that recognize
each other using face-based visual information. At the moment,
for understandable reasons, comparative efforts are characterized
by convenience sampling – testing species that researchers happen
have easy access to – but a more theoretically driven selection of
test species will be necessary if we are to understand the selective
forces that have shaped face-sensitive mechanisms.
A complementary approach to the question of the phyloge-
netic distribution of the holistic processing of faces, which blends
into the next section considering evidence that the face-processing
mechanism in humans has adaptation-signifying properties, is to
examine the kinds of face to which holistic/configural processing
in humans extends. Burke et al. (2012) explored the size of the
inversion effect and the composite effect using three different suc-
cessive same-different tasks (matching top halves in the composite
task) for a range of different face stimuli. In the first experiment,
the inversion effect was large and robust (in errors, reaction time,
and efficiency measures) for the faces of humans and chimpanzees,
slightly smaller for the faces of marmosets, significantly smaller
again for the faces of gibbons and cats and for homogenous plants
(all small agaves), and absent for images of apples. In experiment
2, probing the effect with primate faces more fully, there were again
very large inversion effects for the faces of humans, common chim-
panzees, and marmosets, smaller effects for the faces of bonobos
and gibbons, and almost no effect for the faces of gorillas and
orang-utans. This study shows a disproportionate inversion effect
for human faces that extends to the faces of common chimpanzees,
and to a lesser extent to the faces of a range of other primates,
but not to those of gorillas or orang-utans. This does not map
neatly onto phylogeny, nor familiarity, given that marmosets are
likely seen much less frequently than gorillas, orang-utans, or even
bonobos – although common chimpanzees are probably the most
frequently encountered non-human primate, and so perhaps there
is some role for familiarity. This suggests that the mechanism that
is responsible for producing the disproportionate inversion effect
for faces in humans is tuned equally well (at least in our sample)
to human and common chimpanzee faces, and to a lesser extent
to the faces of marmosets, gibbons, and bonobos. It is unknown
to what extent this tuning is shaped by experience.
In contrast, the composite effect (tested with human, bonobo,
common chimp, gorilla, orang-utans, gibbon, and marmoset
faces) was specific to the faces of humans – there was no evidence
of a composite effect for the face of any other species, and in fact it
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was slightly negative for marmoset faces, which had shown a large
inversion effect. This is a clear dissociation between the mecha-
nism that produces the disproportionate inversion effect and the
one that produces the composite effect, in that, at least in the
humans we tested, the composite effect is exclusive to human faces
(not just to faces, as has been suggested previously – Robbins and
McKone, 2007). Given that there is quite good evidence that rhesus
macaques also show the composite effect (only tested with faces
of their own species), we have evidence that the holistic process-
ing that produces the composite effect is present in two old-world
primates (albeit one a monkey and one an ape), and that it may be
restricted to own-species faces. As suggested earlier, more species
need to be tested more carefully and with more faces to more fully
understand the nature of this kind of holistic processing even in
the primates.
SIGNS OF SPECIAL DESIGN
Testing whether human face processing shows special design fea-
tures is difficult because although there is a widespread (largely
implicit) assumption that the underlying mechanism is for identity
recognition, the putative neural substrate of such processing (the
fusiform face area), and the behavioral markers of holistic pro-
cessing (like the inversion and composite effects) have not been
tested thoroughly enough with other possibilities to be confident
that this is true. Both comparative studies and studies focused on
revealing signs of special design are hampered by the fact that we
do not actually have a very clear idea of the function of holis-
tic/configural processing, and so it is difficult to make predictions
about what species ought to show it, or for what kinds of judgments
it is necessary.
While holistic/configural processing was first discovered in the
context of extracting identity information this is not necessarily
the source of face-based information for which such process-
ing is most obviously useful, or for which it evolved. It is true
that faces have broadly the same features in the same first order
configuration and differ primarily in terms of the second order
configuration of those features (Maurer et al., 2002), but it is also
true that some of the features themselves serve as quite reliable
identification cues (Collishaw and Hole, 2000). In fact, given that
identity could be signaled by a range of obvious featural cues (and
is in some species – Tibbetts and Dale, 2007), it is worth ask-
ing why holistic/configural information is used when identifying
individuals, and why individuals do not signal their identity more
obviously. One unexplored possibility is that there might be costs
as well as benefits to signaling identity (Tibbetts and Dale, 2007),
as there are with all evolved signals, and so perhaps the signal-
ing of identity-based on configural cues represents a compromise
between these. It could be, for example, that signaling identity to
strangers is costly, but to in-group members is beneficial, in which
case we would expect a system of identity signaling to evolve that
reflected this tradeoff. Given that both recognition performance
and holistic processing increase with experience with particular
kinds of faces (e.g., Michel et al., 2006), such a tradeoff could
explain the evolution of a holistic signaling of identity.
One of the few papers to explicitly consider the evolutionary
origin of holistic processing of facial identity was that of McK-
one (2009). Based on evidence that holistic processing of faces
for identity is most evident at simulated distances of between 2
and 10 m, McKone reasonably proposed that this is the distance
at which identification is important to one’s safety, arguing that
subtle expression differences (as an example of another source
of face-based socially important information) would be more
detectable at conversational distances of around 1 m. While this
logic is sound, and may well explain the range over which iden-
tity-based holistic processing operates, and is exactly the kind
of evidence needed to reveal “special design features” of holistic
identity processing, we know that expression information is also
extracted holistically, since such judgments show a top-bottom
composite effect (Calder et al., 2000). Indeed, perceiving many
expressions (particularly complex non-“standard” ones) probably
requires integration across the whole face, and some expressions
show differential patterns of lateralized production depending on
whether they are genuine or faked (Indersmitten and Gur, 2003),
and so left-right integration of expression information might also
be important for detecting dishonest social partners, an ability
with obvious potential fitness consequences.
Not only is there good evidence that expression processing is
holistic/configural (Calder et al., 2000), there is also evidence from
single cell recording studies with monkeys of some expression sen-
sitivity in temporal lobe “identity” sensitive regions of the brain
(Perrett et al., 1992; Sugase et al., 1999), brain-damage-based iden-
tity processing difficulties (prosopagnosia) frequently co-occur
with expression processing difficulties (Calder and Young, 2005),
and expression aftereffects are partially tuned to facial identity,
suggesting overlapping neural processing (Campbell and Burke,
2009). This suggests that both the specialized neural area and
the behavioral markers of “special” processing are not exclusively
related to extracting identity information, which, in turn, raises
questions about what holistic/configural processing might then be
for.
A possibility that has not been considered previously (in part
because the evolutionary origin of holistic processing has not
been much considered) is that the fact that identity is processed
holistically might actually be a side-effect of selection for other
mechanisms that need to extract other kinds of face-based infor-
mation holistically – or this could have been how holistic process-
ing started for faces, and then identity processing co-opted the
existing mechanism(s). Along these lines, Robbins and Coltheart
(2012) suggested that integrating information across the face and
across the body, producing holistic processing, seems likely to be
important for a range of communicative functions, and for judg-
ing symmetry (known to be important in mate choice). Below we
list six potential candidates, other than identity, for the evolution-
ary origin of the holistic processing of faces, since each of them
requires some degree of integration of information from different
regions of the face, but there are likely others.
(i) Expression (as already discussed) and other face-based signals
of behavioral intent, perhaps including assessments of honesty,
trustworthiness, approachability/friendliness, dangerousness,
aggressiveness, etc. (Robbins and Coltheart, 2012).
(ii) Sex-judgments, since sexually dimorphic signals relate to the
relative size of jaws and upper faces (Burke and Sulikowski,
2010).
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(iii) Masculinity and femininity of faces, which signal sex-hormone
levels, and so are important in mate-choice decisions, and
therefore attractiveness judgments (Burke and Sulikowski,
2010).
(iv) Facial symmetry, another important determinant of attractive-
ness (Thornhill and Gangestad, 1994), and which obviously
involves integrating information from the left and right halves
of a face (as suggested by Robbins and Coltheart, 2012).
(v) Relatedness (DeBruine, 2005), biologically important as a basis
of kin-selection (and incest avoidance), and which also likely
depends on integrating information across the whole face.
(vi) Age, since it is primarily the configuration of the features
of a face and the face outline that shift during development
(Pittenger et al., 1979).
Each of these is a source of face-based information with obvious
survival and reproductive import, and which depends on inte-
grating information across the whole face. Any, or all, of them
could have provided the original selection pressure for processing
faces holistically. In order to discover which are most important,
and to develop and test theories of the evolution of this mech-
anism, we will need to run experiments examining the role of
holistic/configural processing in extracting each of these sources
of face-based information, across a range of carefully selected
(and well tested) species. To date, almost all of the research has
been conducted on one species (humans) extracting one source of
face-based information (identity).
A few studies have used the composite effect to examine the
role of holistic processing in general attractiveness judgments
(Abbas and Duchaine, 2008), judgments of sex (Baudouin and
Humphreys, 2006), of Age (Hole and George, 2011), and of trust-
worthiness (Todorov et al., 2010), and each concludes that such
information is extracted holistically, but because they are isolated
studies, using idiosyncratic methodologies, the conclusions are
difficult to evaluate. For example, Todorov et al. used a statistically
derived, computer-generated manipulation of “trustworthiness,”
in which trustworthiness co-varies with expression, and so per-
haps the composite effect they measured is operating at the level
of expression perception rather than trustworthiness perception
itself. Similarly, the age composite task of Hole and George con-
tained no misaligned condition, and so general interference from
the to-be-ignored half (in the aligned condition) may account
for the effect they reported, and the attractiveness study of Abbas
and Duchaine did contain a “misaligned” condition, but rather
than laterally offsetting the two halves, they were presented ver-
tically aligned, but with the top of the face below the bottom,
making it difficult to compare their results to those of identity
composite effect studies. Baudouin and Humphreys used a con-
ventional composite task paradigm, but 15 of their 16 participants
were female (in a sex-judgment task), and so it is possible that the
results may not generalize to males.
CONCLUSION
Attempting to derive an understanding of the evolution of holis-
tic/configural processing of faces using the evidence so far gath-
ered is challenging for two main reasons. First, many psychology
and neuroscience researchers are naturally focused on proximate
rather than ultimate explanations, and so have examined how face
processing works, rather than why it works the way it does. This
focus has led to a widespread misapprehension that evidence sup-
porting an experience-independent face-specific neural area for
face processing is necessary to conclude that the holistic process-
ing of faces is an evolved adaptation. Whichever side of this debate
particular researchers fall, each seems satisfied that adopting one
position or the other is equivalent to deciding that our ability to
process faces is either an evolved ability or a learned ability. We
have argued, in common with modern perspectives on the evo-
lution of psychological/neural mechanisms (e.g., McNamara and
Houston, 2009; Barrett, 2012), that this is not a reliable way of
assessing whether a mechanism is an evolved adaptation, and that
instead, what is needed is a careful analysis of the costs and benefits
of the mechanisms within a known social/environmental context,
followed by tests of the extent to which the mechanism is distrib-
uted in the hypothesized way across different species with known
relatedness and relevant ecologies (in this case social ecology). The
second challenge is that although some of the comparative stud-
ies have been designed to test the phylogenetic and/or ecological
distribution of holistic face processing, none has done this with a
clear idea of the function of the face-processing mechanisms they
are examining, being instead motivated to examine whether holis-
tic face processing is unique to humans. This is compounded by
methodological shortcomings calling into question many of the
conclusions drawn.
With these challenges in mind, the broad conclusions of the
current review are that there is good evidence of an inversion
effect in identity judgments in humans and old world and new
world monkeys (that may be biggest for faces with which the test
species is familiar), but no genuinely convincing evidence yet of
such an effect in a non-primate or even another ape species, and
good evidence of a composite effect in identity judgments in rhe-
sus macaques (an old-world monkey) and humans. In humans,
Burke et al. (2012) found that the inversion effect in identity judg-
ments is as strong for the faces of common chimpanzees as it is
for the faces of humans, almost as large for the faces of marmosets
(a distantly related new world species), and smaller or absent for
other ape species. The composite effect, in contrast, is exclusive to
human faces, suggesting that the kind of processing that under-
pins the composite effect in humans operates on a very restricted
input (only human faces), a sign of “special design,” consistent
with the underlying mechanism being an evolved adaptation. It
would be interesting to know the extent to which this own-species
specificity applies to other species that demonstrate a reliable com-
posite effect (so far only rhesus macaques). Currently, the data do
not allow us to draw any firm conclusions even about which species
show the inversion effect and composite effect, let alone trying to
map out when in the human lineage the mechanisms underpin-
ning such processing evolved. This is, however, an achievable goal,
if related species (initially of apes) are carefully tested with sound
methodologies and high-quality stimuli.
A complimentary approach to trying to understand the evo-
lution of a particular mechanism is to attempt to measure the
costs and benefits of the operation of the mechanism, in order to
understand the constraints on selection that shaped its evolution.
Usually this is done with a clear idea of the functional benefit of
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the mechanism in mind, but as we have argued, it is currently
impossible to be sure even which kind of face-processing bene-
fits most from holistic processing, and so a cost-benefit analysis
is premature. At the moment we have good evidence from the
composite task that identity-, expression- (at least the six “basic”
expressions), and sex-judgments (at least by females) involve holis-
tic processing, and some evidence that this might also be true for
judgments of age, attractiveness, and trustworthiness. The mere
fact that holistic processing extends beyond identity recognition
raises the possibility it initially evolved to extract a different kind
of face-based information, and the fact that face-recognition abil-
ity shows substantial heritability raises the additional possibility
that it may have been sexual selection (serving mate-choice or
intra-sexual competition functions) rather than natural selection
(serving survival or direct reproductive functions) that led to the
evolution of holistic face processing. If sexual selection is respon-
sible for the evolution of holistic processing, then we might expect
sex differences in holistic processing, especially for some kinds of
judgments.
To properly address the evolution of holistic face processing,
and to consequently develop a proper understanding of its func-
tion, it might be instructive to forget that it was first uncovered
using identity judgments, and to re-examine the question from a
functional perspective – to ask ourselves what kind of face-based
information is most likely to benefit from integrating information
across the face? From this perspective, identity seems a much less
likely candidate than subtle expression (or communicative func-
tions in general), in which a multitude of nuanced meanings can
be conveyed by different combinations of dynamically unfolding
configurations of facial distortions. Judgments of subtle variations
in masculinity and femininity, which are known to be important
in mate-choice/attractiveness decisions, also seem more likely to
require integration of information across the face than judgments
of identity, a possibility consistent with evidence that holistic pro-
cessing may be at least partly a consequence of sexual selection.
These are simply speculations based on a consideration of the
possible function of holistic integration of information across the
face. This kind of speculation is useful, but to become testable
hypotheses about the evolution of holistic processing they need
to be informed and constrained by good data about which precise
kinds of face perception involve holistic processing (manipulations
of the facial factors known to affect attractiveness, for example,
rather than just overall attractiveness), and the species that show
such effects.
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